Federal Cybersecurity Infrastructure Assessment Foreign Adversary Access and Governance Failures 08/18/2025 11:25 PM

Federal Cybersecurity Infrastructure Assessment: Foreign Adversary Access and Governance Failures

Executive Summary

Based on extensive technical analysis and investigative research, this assessment identifies critical national security vulnerabilities within federal IT infrastructure arising from three interconnected threat vectors: (1) foreign adversary exploitation of legitimate government TLS certificates, (2) inadequately vetted personnel with broad system access, and (3) systemic failures in cybersecurity governance during organizational transitions.

The evidence strongly suggests coordinated foreign intelligence activities targeting U.S. government systems, combined with likely exploitable vulnerabilities created by rapid personnel changes and insufficient access controls. These findings require immediate Congressional oversight and remediation.

2025 11:24 PM

Key Risk Assessment

• HIGH PROBABILITY/HIGH IMPACT: Foreign TLS certificate reflection attacks

• HIGH PROBABILITY/MEDIUM IMPACT: Unvetted personnel system access

• MEDIUM PROBABILITY/HIGH IMPACT: BGP routing manipulation

• MEDIUM PROBABILITY/MEDIUM IMPACT: Database exposure incidents

Section I: Foreign Adversary Infrastructure Analysis

A. TLS Certificate Reflection Attacks

Technical Finding: Russian and Chinese IP addresses have been observed presenting legitimate, unrevoked U.S. government TLS certificates, including wildcard certificates for *.treasury.gov and other sensitive domains.

Critical Timeline:

• January 15, 2025: Russian Aeza network (AS210644) begins presenting certificates for usa.gov, fedidcard.gov, and related domains

• February 10-11, 2025: Chinese Alibaba Cloud servers (AS45102) observed with Treasury Department wildcard certificates

• March 10-26, 2025: Additional Chinese and South Korean infrastructure found with USPTO and Treasury certificates

Technical Analysis: This represents a sophisticated “Reflected TLS Attack” technique where adversaries use socat or similar tools to proxy legitimate government TLS handshakes, creating the appearance of authorized government servers while potentially:

• Conducting reconnaissance on government network architectures

• Establishing covert command-and-control channels

• Bypassing network security controls that whitelist government certificate authorities

B. Autonomous System Analysis

Aeza Group (AS210644/AS216246):

• Confirmed threat actor - Sanctioned by OFAC July 1, 2025 for providing “bulletproof hosting” services

• Active evasion: Post-sanctions infrastructure migration to AS211522 (Hypercore LTD) detected July 20, 2025

• BGP routing anomalies: Dual announcements suggesting intentional traffic redirection

Assessment: The presence of legitimate U.S. government certificates on sanctioned Russian infrastructure represents either:

1. Direct compromise of government certificate authorities (UNLIKELY based on technical evidence)

2. Advanced persistent threat operations using reflection techniques (LIKELY)

3. Insider collaboration enabling certificate access (POSSIBLE but unsubstantiated)

Section II: Personnel and Access Control Failures

A. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) Staffing Concerns

Critical Personnel Issue: Edward Coristine, age 19, granted senior advisor access to multiple sensitive agencies despite documented history of cybersecurity violations.

Background:

• 2022: Terminated from cybersecurity firm Path Network for leaking proprietary information to competitors

• 2022: Boasted of maintaining unauthorized access to former employer’s systems post-termination

• 2023: Company (DiamondCDN) provided services to cybercrime group “EGodly” involved in swatting and PII sales

• 2025: Granted access to CISA, DHS, Treasury, and other sensitive systems without apparent security clearance review

Systemic Pattern: Multiple young, inexperienced individuals (ages 19-25) with limited government experience and potential security concerns have been granted extensive federal system access, including:

• Luke Farritor (23): SpaceX intern granted DoE access over legal objections

• Marko Elez: Granted Treasury admin access, revoked after racist social media posts, then reinstated

• Gavin Kliger (25): Given access to IRS taxpayer data systems (IDRS)

B. Rapid Organizational Changes

Timeline of Leadership Disruption:

• January 31: Treasury senior official resigns over DOGE data requests

• February 16: SSA Administrator Michelle King resigns after refusing DOGE access

• February 25: Mass resignations from U.S. Digital Service

• March-May: Continued resignations across agencies

Assessment: These rapid changes likely created security vulnerabilities during transition periods, potentially enabling the foreign adversary access documented in Section I.

Section III: Database and System Exposure Analysis

A. Azure Government Cloud Vulnerabilities

Findings: Significant increases in exposed federal database systems:

• Azure Government databases: From baseline of 10 systems to 99+ systems since January 2025

• SQL Server instances: 130+ exposed ports across 93 unique IPs

• PostgreSQL systems: Multiple instances returning “no password supplied” responses

Critical Examples:

• Treasury payment systems (BFS) accessed by DOGE personnel

• VA disability rating databases targeted for “data mining”

• IRS Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) access requested

• OPM personnel records (2.1 million workers) database access modified

B. Network Infrastructure Anomalies

BGP Routing Spikes: Treasury AS13506 announcements increased dramatically:

• February 10: 1,586 → 4,116 daily announcements (+159%)

• February 11: 5,675 daily announcements (+258%)

• March 5: 7,257 daily announcements (+357%)

Assessment: These spikes coincide precisely with foreign adversary certificate activity, suggesting possible connection between infrastructure changes and observed threats.

Section IV: Cybersecurity Framework Analysis

NIST Cybersecurity Framework Assessment

GOVERN Function: FAILED

• Inadequate personnel vetting processes

• Insufficient access control governance

• Lack of risk management oversight

IDENTIFY Function: PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE

• Asset discovery identified vulnerabilities

• Risk assessment processes bypassed during transitions

PROTECT Function: COMPROMISED

• Access controls circumvented

• Personnel security measures inadequate

• Network security monitoring gaps

DETECT Function: LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS

• Foreign certificate activity detected through third-party monitoring

• Internal detection capabilities appear compromised

RESPOND Function: NOT EVALUATED

• No evidence of coordinated incident response

RECOVER Function: NOT APPLICABLE

• Ongoing vulnerabilities not yet addressed

Section V: Congressional Oversight Recommendations

Primary Committee Jurisdiction

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

• Rationale: Foreign intelligence threat assessment requires classified briefings

• Specific Focus: Russian/Chinese government involvement, intelligence community coordination

• Recommended Actions: Closed hearings with IC leadership, threat assessment briefings

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)

• Rationale: Oversight of counterintelligence failures

• Specific Focus: Assessment of damage from foreign access, coordination with FBI/NSA

• Recommended Actions: Classified damage assessment, CI investigation oversight

Secondary Committee Involvement

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

• Focus: Federal IT security governance failures, personnel security processes

• Witnesses: CISA Director, OPM Director, GSA Administrator

• Timeline: Public hearings within 30 days

House Committee on Oversight and Accountability

• Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, IT and Government Innovation (Chair: Nancy Mace)

• Focus: DOGE personnel security failures, system access controls

• Timeline: Public hearings with technical expert testimony

House Committee on Homeland Security

• Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection

• Focus: Critical infrastructure protection failures

• Coordination: Joint hearings with Oversight Committee

Supporting Committee Actions

Senate Committee on Armed Services: Defense implications of government certificate compromise House Committee on Armed Services: Military system security review Senate Committee on Finance: IRS system security (given taxpayer data access) House Committee on Ways and Means: Treasury system security oversight

Section VI: Recommended Immediate Actions

Executive Branch Requirements

1. Immediate Security Review (7 days):

   • Comprehensive audit of all DOGE personnel security clearances

   • Review of all foreign IP access to government certificates

   • Assessment of database exposure incidents

2. Access Control Remediation (14 days):

   • Suspension of suspect personnel pending investigation

   • Revocation of certificates observed on foreign infrastructure

   • Implementation of enhanced BGP monitoring

3. Damage Assessment (30 days):

   • Classified assessment of potential intelligence compromise

   • Review of all data accessed by DOGE personnel

   • Analysis of foreign adversary intelligence gains

Legislative Actions

1. Enhanced Oversight Authority:

   • Mandatory security clearance verification for all federal IT access

   • Regular reporting requirements for certificate authority security

   • BGP monitoring and reporting requirements

2. Personnel Security Reform:

   • Stricter background investigation requirements

   • Mandatory waiting periods for sensitive position appointments

   • Enhanced oversight of temporary personnel arrangements

Section VII: Analytic Confidence and Limitations

High Confidence Assessments

• Foreign adversaries have gained unauthorized presentation of legitimate government certificates

• Personnel security processes were bypassed during DOGE implementation

• Database exposure incidents have increased significantly since January 2025

Medium Confidence Assessments

• Certificate activity represents likely intelligence collection operations

• Personnel security failures probably enabled some foreign access

• BGP routing anomalies may indicate coordinated adversary activity

Key Intelligence Gaps

• Scope of adversary access: Unknown whether foreign actors gained access to certificate private keys or are using reflection techniques

• Data exfiltration assessment: Unclear what sensitive information may have been accessed or stolen

• Attribution confidence: While infrastructure is linked to Russian/Chinese entities, ultimate attribution requires classified intelligence assessment

Appendices

Appendix A: Technical Indicators

• Complete list of foreign IP addresses with government certificates

• BGP routing anomaly timeline

• Database exposure incident details

Appendix B: Personnel Security Timeline

• Detailed chronology of DOGE appointments

• Security clearance documentation gaps

• Resignation timeline correlation analysis

Appendix C: Mitigation Framework

• Immediate technical countermeasures

• Long-term security architecture recommendations

• Congressional oversight framework implementation

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Distribution: Congressional Leadership, Relevant Committee Chairs and Ranking Members Author: [REDACTED] - Independent Cybersecurity Assessment Date: August 2025