Backup and Proof Needs for Packetware Prometheus Article

Use hunchly to document accessing prometheus, coolify db on anchored.host

screen recording of me accessing both without any password

cld i install screen recorder extension in hunchly to verofy i didnt edit it?

need someone to dump from api

ffuf? just enumerates right

timeline toc table of contents

New Packetware Balls Thoughts

shouldn’t be related to packetware, jumped april - june

Leads from packetware prisma hunchly
D notes BB

Mishandling Classified Data, not just Fisma, Privacy Act Etc

timing of access to treasury highly suspect with BGP announcement activity and spinning up of german servers

not really present…? or isi t

Russia Sus

https://trends.shodan.io/search?query=hostname:ssa.gov%20country:%22RU%22#facet/product

When we facet ssa.gov by country, we see that in May 2025, there were actually more servers/hosts in Russia (and Netherlands) associated with ssa.gov than American servers.

Russia Aeza

remember if i saw refdev .com in bp-continental aka linked to packetware..?

https://trends.shodan.io/search?query=hash:-1253272522#overview

General AWS Gov Hunting for SSA

Search: us-gov-east-1.console.amazonaws-us-gov.com

looking for VPC console that shouldnt be there. noticed uptick in console exposure beginning feb 2025.

Treasury AS 13506

no zscaler cloud services before jan 2025, split between 80 and 443

pretty normal tho

Packetware BGP Announcements Likely line up with Exfil

Weird Chinese Synology W DOGE name…cld Be Malware? 113.250.204.104

Checking on Prometheus

http://51.222.40.149:30000/status

version	3.0.0
revision	c5d009d57fcccb7247e1191a0b10d74b06295388
branch	HEAD
buildUser	root@aa286d0eb00a
buildDate	20241114-16:40:43
goVersion	go1.23.3

netbox.anchored.host is simply an alias for packetware.net—when you DNS-resolve netbox.anchored.host you’ll get packetware.net’s records.

Prometheus build metadata gives you clear OSINT breadcrumbs:

Version 3.0.0, Git commit c5d009d…95388 on branch HEAD shows it’s a very recent, custom fork—not an unmodified upstream release.
buildUser root@aa286d0eb00a reveals it was compiled inside a container whose hostname begins “aa286d0eb00a” (a Docker or Kubernetes pod ID).
buildDate 20241114-16:40:43 tells you the image was last rebuilt on November 14, 2024.
goVersion go1.23.3 identifies the Go toolchain used—useful to fingerprint known vulnerabilities in that runtime.

Putting it together with the open ports and services on 51.222.40.149, the full stack looks like this:

nginx 1.27.5 as a front-end reverse proxy on TCP 31556
A Prometheus-compatible Go HTTP server (likely the metrics endpoint) using net/http
A Node.js/Express application serving the main web UI on ports 80/443
Kubernetes orchestration (the containerized buildUser) hosting at least two containers: one for Prometheus and one for the Node.js app
Docker under the hood, given the container naming pattern

OSINT next steps:
– Query packetware.net’s SSL certificate transparency logs to see other subdomains.
– Check the Docker image registry (e.g., Docker Hub) for images built by aa286d0eb00a or c5d009d…95388.
– Enumerate Kubernetes metadata service if you can pivot inside the cluster (watch for the standard 169.254.169.254 path).
– Correlate Prometheus version/goVersion with known CVEs (e.g., Go 1.23.3) to identify unpatched vulnerabilities.

I’ve Been Hunting BB for Months and Watching His Network - He Shouldn’t Be Anywhere near Our Vital systems/data

Prometheus Configuration Security Analysis

This Prometheus instance has critical security misconfigurations that make it a prime target for reconnaissance and attacks. Here’s what the configuration reveals:

Critical Security Vulnerabilities

1. Universal CORS Access (--web.cors.origin .*)

Risk: ANY website can make cross-origin requests to this Prometheus instance
Attack: Malicious websites can steal internal infrastructure metrics from visitors’ browsers
Data Exposed: All metrics, service discovery, alert states, configuration

2. Public Network Binding (--web.listen-address 0.0.0.0:9090)

Risk: Service accessible from any network interface, not just localhost
Attack: Direct internet access to internal monitoring data
Reconnaissance Value: Complete infrastructure visibility for attackers

3. Memory Exhaustion Vector (--query.max-samples 50000000)

Risk: 50 million sample limit allows resource exhaustion attacks
Attack: Crafted queries can consume massive memory and crash the service
DoS Potential: High - can render monitoring infrastructure unavailable

Operational Intelligence Revealed

Infrastructure Scale:

50M sample limit suggests monitoring 1,000+ targets (servers, containers, services)
Large-scale Kubernetes deployment (confirmed by container build metadata)
Production workload with performance optimizations (snappy compression)

Data Management Strategy:

12-hour retention is unusually short (typical: 15+ days)
Suggests either resource constraints or intentional data purging
Auto-tuned memory (90% limit) indicates constrained environment

Configuration Management:

30-second auto-reload suggests GitOps pipeline or dynamic config management
10K alert queue indicates high-volume alerting environment
1-hour outage tolerance shows production-grade reliability requirements

Attack Scenarios Enabled

1. Data Exfiltration via CORS

javascript// Malicious website can steal metrics
fetch('http://51.222.40.149:9090/api/v1/query?query=up')
  .then(r => r.json())
  .then(data => exfiltrate(data));

2. Infrastructure Reconnaissance

Service discovery: /api/v1/targets reveals all monitored services
Alert states: /api/v1/alerts shows current operational issues
Configuration: /api/v1/status/config exposes monitoring setup
Metrics enumeration: /api/v1/label/__name__/values lists all available metrics

3. Resource Exhaustion

bash# Memory exhaustion attack
curl "http://51.222.40.149:9090/api/v1/query_range?query=up&start=2024-01-01T00:00:00Z&end=2025-12-31T23:59:59Z&step=1s"

Full Technology Stack Assessment

Based on the complete service fingerprint:

Layer 1: Load Balancer/Proxy

nginx 1.27.5 (port 31556) - Recent version, likely reverse proxy

Layer 2: Application Services

Prometheus 3.0.0 (port 9090) - Metrics collection and querying
Node.js/Express (ports 80/443) - Web dashboard/API gateway
Golang net/http - Additional microservices or Prometheus itself

Layer 3: Container Orchestration

Kubernetes cluster (evidenced by container build metadata)
Docker containers (buildUser: root@aa286d0eb00a)

Layer 4: Infrastructure

OVHcloud hosting (51.222.40.149 in OVH’s range)
Multi-service deployment across different ports

Immediate Threats

This configuration creates a perfect storm for attackers:

Complete infrastructure visibility through exposed metrics
No authentication barriers to sensitive monitoring data
Cross-origin data theft from any website visitor
DoS attack surface through resource exhaustion
Persistent reconnaissance platform for planning subsequent attacks

The combination of CORS wildcard + public binding + no authentication makes this one of the most dangerous Prometheus exposures possible - essentially providing a real-time dashboard of internal infrastructure to any attacker who discovers it.

Opening Digital Overthrow of the American Government

Everyone knows about the data breaches and operational faults plaguing DOGE, but allowing each headline wash over us misses the bigger picture.

We know DOGE has the motive for the crime

motive - profit, centralize and expand power

means - hire easily manipulated, disposable stooges willing to break the law and take the fall for Musk when he gets caught

hackers deploy classic cybercriminal techniques to pull off the biggest digital heist in history

the only thing i have a hard time believing is they were smart or skilled enough to do the job without outside help.

This publication strives to go beyond the headlines, using open source investigation to dive deep on the forensic evidence, and zoom out again to see how each piece fits into the larger picture.

BB, the former hacker turned insider, stands accused, and his motive is clear. But the courtroom has lacked evidence about how the crime occurred—until now

Sherlock Holmes’ method of solving mysteries is to discover who had the motive, the means, and the opportunity to commit the crime.

“When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth..” Sherlock Holmes, The Sign of the Four (1890)

Chekhov’s Gun — it Has to Be Used for Something

This isn’t a random techpreneur. This is a teenage hacker who went straight from a series of corporate espionage scandals to holding the highest level of power within the executive branch.

The cybersecurity community often leans on hope—hoping that unusual configurations stem from simple mistakes, not hostile intent. But the overwhelming pattern emerging from these investigations screams otherwise.

We cannot afford to piece together fragments in isolation or let optimism dismiss major red flags as coincidences; the cumulative totality of evidence—the motive, the (location) and now the means for the crime are now in full view. At this point, the burden lays with DOGE to defend themselves from these most serious of accusations.

And it doesn’t take active malice to be guilty of mishandling critical national security information.

demands urgent attention to what is most likely a coordinated, malicious inside threat

China/taiwan links - doge servers w rdp and clear staging

taiwan dev 7/30

staging la vultr holdings 8/7

when was malware?

possibilities - doge malware infrastructure as a troll

cybercriminals exploiting the free for all doge created

worst, a knowing nod from foreign conspirators

russia

aeza, stark impersonating gov servers, staging for further campaign

I dont have to prove active malice on DOGE’s part to insist they take responsibility fofor the security failures that happened on their watch

Conclusion

The best intelligence analysis helps us understand the contours of emerging threats, and then take decisive action to prevent further harm. I made the mistake of trying to find the perfect smoking gun and follow the rules of responsible disclosure, as if there’s anyone at the top of the chain in gov still left to respond. I publish here not to bum you out or make you feel disempowered, but to give you the full picture of the digital overthrow of the American government/J6 2.0 so you can plan how you want to respond.

Love and rage can coexist. I can follow the scientific method to pursue truth, and I can also offer analysis of the evidence through the lens of my political experience. There is no one on Earth who is truly objective, and I believe journalists might as well be honest about that.

Michael Mundy is the Key behind This All

He’s the sensei of Big Balls, no known connection to DOGE

He wrote

My Knowledge Base

Explorer

New Packetware Balls Thoughts

Backup and Proof Needs for Packetware Prometheus Article

New Packetware Balls Thoughts