Perplexity Explains Prometheus Atrack Flow
explain how this wld work in attack flow for data exfil starting w us gov insider threat who spins up container, grabs agency data, then the metrics dump container names and explain how the completely open api wld allow the c2 to identify new containers and dump the data
is the proxying just an added layer of obfuscation but the main purpose of exposing the api and all cors origin policy so c2s/globally distributed conspirators know where to find new containers/data as theyre spun up
explain in simple terms how it goes from knowing container id to scraping contents of container
[Big Balls Has Your Security Number. And a global “Black Box” network perfect for sending it anywhere in the world ](<./../Big-Balls-Has-Your-Security-Number.-And-a-global-Black-Box-network-perfect-for-sending-it-anywhere-in-the-world-.md> “Big Balls Has Your Security Number. And a global “Black Box” network perfect for sending it anywhere in the world ”)
new packetwarw db coolify prasma whatever
big balls prometheus perplexity first pass
Perplexity technical and plain language prometheus
**US Government Insider Threat Attack Flow: Container to Data Exfiltration**
Here’s how the attack would work in simple terms, step by step:
**Phase 1: Insider Creates Malicious Container**
**US Government Insider** (legitimate user with network access):
- Spins up a container within the agency’s Kubernetes cluster
- Container is designed to access sensitive agency data (classified documents, databases, user records)
- Uses legitimate credentials and permissions to avoid initial suspicion
**Phase 2: Open API Broadcasts Container Information**
**The Critical Vulnerability**: Kubernetes API is completely open with permissive CORS policy
- **Anyone on the internet** can query the API without authentication[1][2][3]
- C2 servers automatically scan for new containers by calling API endpoints like:
- `/api/v1/pods` (lists all running containers)
- `/api/v1/namespaces/default/pods` (container details)
- **Container names, IDs, and metadata are exposed** to attackers in real-time[1][4]
**Phase 3: From Container ID to Data Scraping**
Once attackers have the container ID, they can access container contents through multiple attack vectors:
**Method 1: Direct Container Execution**[5][6][7]
```bash
# Attacker uses open API to execute commands inside container
kubectl exec -it
# Now has shell access to container filesystem and data
```
**Method 2: Container Log Extraction**[8][9][10]
```bash
# Dump all container logs (may contain sensitive data)
kubectl logs
# Extract data written to stdout/stderr streams
```
**Method 3: Container Filesystem Access**[6][7]
```bash
# Browse container filesystem directly
kubectl exec
kubectl exec
# Copy files from container to attacker systems
```
**Phase 4: Proxying for Obfuscation**
**Yes, proxying is primarily for obfuscation**, not the main attack vector:
- Envoy proxies route traffic through multiple layers[11]
- **Hides the true source/destination** of data exfiltration traffic
- Makes forensic analysis and traffic tracing much harder
- **But the open API is the real enabler** - proxying just helps avoid detection
**Simple Summary: Container ID → Data Access**
1. **Open API gives away container location**: “Container X is running at location Y”
2. **Attackers use API to access container directly**: `kubectl exec` gives shell access
3. **Once inside container, attackers can read/copy all data**: Files, databases, logs, secrets
4. **Proxies hide the traffic**: Data theft looks like normal network traffic
- **Real-time discovery**: C2 knows about new containers **the moment they start**[1]
- **No authentication barriers**: Open CORS policy means anyone can query the API[12][13]
- **Direct data access**: Container ID = full access to container contents[5][6]
- **Global conspiracy enablement**: Distributed attackers worldwide can monitor and steal from US government containers automatically
The **open API with permissive CORS** essentially turns your Kubernetes cluster into a **public directory** where anyone can find containers and steal their data. The proxying just helps them do it without getting caught.
Citations:
[1] Kubernetes Threat Hunting using API Server Audit Logs - Logpoint https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/emerging-threats/kubernetes-threat-hunting-using-api-server-audit-logs/
[2] Unauthorized Access to the Kubernetes API Server - KubeOps https://kubeops.net/kubernetes-security-library/risks/34-unauthorized-access-to-the-kubernetes-api-server
[3] Kubernetes Security - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Kubernetes\_Security\_Cheat\_Sheet.html
[4] Kubernetes API Security - Upwind https://www.upwind.io/glossary/kubernetes-api-security
[5] kubectl exec: Commands, Examples, and Best Practices - Last9 https://last9.io/blog/kubectl-exec-commands-examples-and-best-practices/
[6] Get a Shell to a Running Container - Kubernetes https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-application/get-shell-running-container/
[7] kubectl exec | Kubernetes https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubectl\_exec/
[8] Using Kubectl Logs: Complete Guide to Viewing Kubernetes Pod Logs https://signoz.io/blog/kubectl-logs/
[9] kubectl logs: How to Get Pod Logs in Kubernetes (With Examples) https://kodekloud.com/blog/kubectl-logs/
[10] kubectl logs - Kubernetes https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubectl\_logs/
[11] Proxyjacking: The Latest Cybercriminal Side Hustle https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/proxyjacking-new-campaign-cybercriminal-side-hustle
[12] What is CORS? Breaking Down Cross-Origin Resource … https://konghq.com/blog/learning-center/what-is-cors-cross-origin-resource-sharing
[13] What security risks exist when setting Access-Control-Allow … https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12001269/what-security-risks-exist-when-setting-access-control-allow-origin-to-accept-all
[14] Using the Dirty Pipe vulnerability to break out from containers https://www.datadoghq.com/blog/engineering/dirty-pipe-container-escape-poc/
[15] Kubernetes Logs: How to Collect and Use Them - Last9 https://last9.io/blog/kubernetes-logs/
[16] Pod Exec in K8s: Advanced Exec Scenarios and Best Practices | Last9 https://last9.io/blog/pod-exec-in-kubernetes/
[17] Logging Architecture | Kubernetes https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/logging/
[18] Detect Suspicious ‘exec’ Commands in kube-system Namespace https://www.upwind.io/feed/detect-suspicious-exec-commands-in-kube-system-namespace
[19] Kubernetes Container Escape Using Linux Kernel Exploit https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/cve-2022-0185-kubernetes-container-escape-using-linux-kernel-exploit/
[20] A Practical Guide to Kubernetes Logging - Logz.io https://logz.io/blog/a-practical-guide-to-kubernetes-logging/
[21] Protecting Kubernetes Against MITRE ATT&CK: Execution - Red Hat https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/protecting-kubernetes-against-mitre-attck-execution
[22] Kubernetes Security Best Practices: Definitive Guide | CSA https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/articles/kubernetes-security-best-practices-definitive-guide
[23] Kubernetes Security: Best Practices for Building a Secure Environment https://www.getambassador.io/blog/kubernetes-security-best-practices-secure-environment
[24] Controlling Access to the Kubernetes API https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/controlling-access/
[25] Kubernetes Exposed: Exploiting the Kubelet API - Aqua Security https://www.aquasec.com/blog/kubernetes-exposed-exploiting-the-kubelet-api/